Search results for "Mechanism design"

On the approximability of the range assignment problem on radio networks in presence of selfish agents

2005

AbstractWe consider the range assignment problem in ad-hoc wireless networks in the context of selfish agents: A network manager aims to assigning transmission ranges to the stations in order to achieve strong connectivity of the network within a minimal overall power consumption. Station is not directly controlled by the manager and may refuse to transmit with a certain transmission range because it might be costly in terms of power consumption.We investigate the existence of payment schemes which induce the stations to follow the decisions of a network manager in computing a range assignment, that is, truthful mechanisms for the range assignment problem. We provide both positive and negat…

Non-linear protocols for optimal distributed consensus in networks of dynamic agents

2006

We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors'' state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents'' initial state. We show that the agents can reach consensus if the value of such a function is time-invariant when computed over the agents'' state trajectories. We use this basic result to introduce a non-linear protocol design rule allowing consensus on a quite general set of values. Such a set includes, e.g., any generalized mean of order p of the agents'' initial states. As a second contribution we show that our protocol design is t…

Full Surplus Extraction in Dynamic Mechanisms.

2012

Models of group-buying in competitive markets

2008

Don't tell us: the demand for secretive bahaviour

2009

International audience

MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL CONSENSUS PROBLEMS

2006

We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed and switching topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors’ state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents’ initial state.We show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal proto…

Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent?

2015

I consider a setting of complete but unverifiable information in which two agents enter a contractual relationship to induce mutually beneficial investments. As my main result, I establish that the famous irrelevance of contracting paradigm, that arises due to the detrimental effect of renegotiation, is resolved if there is a fixed point in time when actions have to be chosen and one accounts for the fact that renegotiation takes time. What drives my optimality result is that, by stipulating when the mechanism is to be played, the agents ensure that renegotiation is possible ex ante but not ex post.

The role of the Access Point in Wi-Fi networks with selfish nodes

2009

In Wi-Fi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing the shared channel by means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF), which is long term fair. But recent drivers allow users to configure protocol parameters differently from their standard values in order to break the protocol fairness and obtain a larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. This motivates a game theoretical analysis of DCF. Previous studies have already modeled access to a shared wireless channel in terms of non-cooperative games among the nodes, but they have mainly considered ad hoc mode operation. In this paper we consider the role of the Access Point (AP…

Essays in optimal taxation and dynamic mechanism design

2010

MAC Design for WiFi Infrastructure Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach

2011

In WiFi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing a shared channel by means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). Although this protocol is in principle fair, since all the stations have the same probability to transmit on the channel, it has been shown that unfair behaviors may emerge in actual networking scenarios because of non-standard configurations of the nodes. Due to the proliferation of open source drivers and programmable cards, enabling an easy customization of the channel access policies, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of random access schemes. Assuming that each node is rational and implements a best response strategy, we show that…